We examine the extent to which two sources of policy uncertainty influence foreign-owned subsidiary exit rates. We find that prior peer exits and a firm's own experience under the current political regime both have a strong influence on subsidiary exit rates, particularly in the presence of policy uncertainty resulting from the existing structure of a host country's political institutions. A firm's own experience under the current political regime of a host country, however, enhances exit rates after changes in that regime. These findings point to tradeoffs between two strategies for moderating political uncertainty. Influence strategies can provide substantial gains to firms in uncertain policy environments so long as those environments themselves are not at risk of radical flux. As the probability that a policy environment could potentially enter a period of radical flux increases, a follow-the-herd strategy becomes more prominent as this strategy avoids the negative consequences of the rapid depreciation of the value of past organizational experience, in the event of a new political regime.
Uncertainty is a prominently featured construct in neoinstitutional research and international business. A primary focus of neoinstitutional research is the mimetic response of an organization to cues in its inter-organizational environment under conditions of uncertainty (Haunschild, 1994 , Haunschild & Miner, 1997 , Haveman, 1993 . A parallel line of research in international business examines how the accumulation of organizational experience reduces a firm's exposure to the potentially adverse influences of uncertainty (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996 , Delios & Henisz, 2003 , Henisz & Delios, 2001 ).
We seek to integrate these two bodies of research by first unpacking the construct of uncertainty to see whether uncertainty emerges from a lack of information about an external environment, or from an underlying dynamism in that external environment (Duncan, 1972) . We then examine the conditions under which either a mimetic response to stimuli in the inter-organizational environment, or a reliance upon organizational experience, is an effective strategy in the face of these sources of uncertainty.
In making this examination, we highlight the idea that organizational experience can generate signals and pressures for managers who seek to fashion strategic responses to uncertainty. This experience, however, has its greatest utility for addressing uncertainty that stems from information shortfalls, in stable environments. In sharp contrast to its positive effect in stable environments, experience can become a liability for addressing information shortfalls, in a dynamic or radically changed external environment. Meanwhile, the signals and pressures generated by the inter-organizational environment, although less helpful than a firm's own experience in stable environments, do not transform into liabilities in dynamic or radically changed external environments.
To test these ideas, we focus on a specific dimension of a firm's external environment, namely the political environment. We look at two sources of uncertainty in the policies generated by that political environment. The first source of policy uncertainty, political hazards, stems from the structure of a nation's existing political institutions that either provides substantial discretion to policymakers or limits their discretion. The second, regime instability, takes the form of widespread protests or concerted efforts to overthrow a nation's existing political institutions.
Our empirical models examine the exit rates of 2,283 international expansions made by 642 Japanese manufacturing firms into 53 countries that differ in their levels of political hazards and regime instability.
BACKGROUND Environmental Uncertainty
Environmental uncertainty is among the foremost challenges with which an organization's management must contend (Thompson, 1967) . A core tenet emerging from research in this area is that organizations seek to avoid uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963) . The pervasiveness of the phenomenon of uncertainty led to the extensive use of the aggregate construct of environmental uncertainty in early studies on organizations (Downey & Slocum, 1975) . This research pointed to the idea that organizations differ in their reactions, and susceptibility, to environmental uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 , Levitt & March, 1988 . Organizational variance in susceptibility to uncertainty stems from heterogeneous organizational resources (Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990) and heterogeneous organizational information.
Research on organizations has begun to emphasize how different organizational information sources can help to mitigate the uncertainty a firm encounters in its external environments (Haunschild, 1994 , Haunschild & Miner, 1997 , but it has yet to explore variations in the types of uncertainty a firm faces in its environments, when making market entry decisions (Henisz & Delios, 2001 ). The benefits of unpacking uncertainty can be profound if researchers strive for a better understanding of the relative efficacy of a particular organizational response to environmental uncertainty.
The idea of examining different types of uncertainty is not particularly novel as there is a long tradition in organization theory research that has placed the construct of uncertainty at its focus (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993 , Dess & Beard, 1984 , Milliken, 1987 . Aside from identifying the importance of uncertainty in the external environment on decision-making in a firm, research on organizations has helped to identify several definitional characteristics of perceived uncertainty (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993) . Uncertainty concerns the lack of information in an environment, given a specific decision-making scenario. This lack of information translates into difficulties in accurately assessing the losses or gains associated with correct or incorrect decisions (Duncan, 1972) . Uncertainty also concerns rates and unpredictability of change in an environment (Dess & Beard, 1984) . As the results of dynamic change are hard to predict, it heightens uncertainty for decision makers.
These characterizations of environmental uncertainty highlight two points of relevance for differentiating among types of uncertainty. First, uncertainty can emerge from a lack of information about a particular environment. Second, uncertainty can arise from instability in that environment. If we examine organizational responses to these two broad types of uncertainty, we can explore the relative efficacy of two key organizational responses to each type. In the first organizational response, information derived from an organization's experience in an environment has been shown to reduce the influence of uncertainty in that environment for that organization (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996 , Delios & Henisz, 2000 , Lu, 2002 . A second organizational response is grounded in research in neoinstitutional theory. Neoinstitutional scholars emphasize that managers can seek cues for responses to uncertainty from the interorganizational environment, or the actions of a reference group of organizations (Haunschild, 1994 , Haunschild & Miner, 1997 , Haveman, 1993 . These cues lead firms to imitate the decisions, strategies and structures of one another, and the prevalence of mimetic behavior tends to increase in the level of environmental uncertainty (Haunschild & Miner, 1997) . In our hypotheses, we discuss how organizational responses to uncertainty can vary depending on whether the uncertainty comes from a lack of information about an environment, or from environmental dynamism.
Two Sources of Policy Uncertainty
The international environment is a setting with copious sources of uncertainty. Scholars have long recognized that cultural, economic, legal, social and political variance by nation injects substantial amounts of uncertainty in a firm's decisions when it undertakes an international expansion (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996 , Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997 , Henisz, 2000b ). An international expansion is a form of organizational growth in which a firm undertakes a foreign direct investment to form a foreign subsidiary in a country other than the one in which it is domiciled.
When expanding internationally, a firm's management often must contend with a new culture, a new language, a new social system, new market structures, and a new political system. To manage an expansion in a new political environment, a firm's management should understand the current and future policies that define the rules and regulations for a firm's operations (e.g., taxes or quantitative restrictions on production, foreign trade and employment and any exemptions thereto; regulations in the realm of employee hiring and firing, benefits, health and safety and the local or national environment) and thereby influence its profitability.
The status quo policies and any changes therein are the outcome of a policymaking process in which various interest groups seek to lobby or influence policymakers who interact within formal or informal policymaking structures. The level of uncertainty over future policies is therefore a function of both the current policymaking structure (i.e., the extent to which it provides checks and balances against the discretion of existing policymakers) and the stability of the existing political structure.
Where political institutions include many checks and balances, such as among the executive, legislative, judicial and sub-federal branches, policymakers are constrained in their choice of policies by other political actors who must approve any change from the status quo policy (Henisz, 2000a , North, 1990 . Countries with extensive checks and balances in the formal policymaking apparatus, such as the United States, Germany and Switzerland, tend to have the lowest levels of policy uncertainty as the multiple veto players involved in the policy making process, find it difficult to agree to change the status quo policy. Policy uncertainty increases as the number of veto players declines or as their preferences become more homogeneous, such as is the case in moving to a mixed Parliamentary-Presidential system, as typified by France or Brazil, to heavily fractionalized Parliamentary systems like Belgium, Israel or the Netherlands to Westminster Parliamentary systems with winner-take-all districts like the United Kingdom.
Transitional and non-democratic states have the highest levels of policy uncertainty as the formal institutional structure in these states provides tremendous discretion to policymakers.
A second source of policy uncertainty is the threat of the emergence of a new political regime.
Where disaffected interest groups are militating for fundamental political reform, the very rules by which policies are made are called into question. The identity of the future political leadership, the process of policymaking and the interest groups allotted voice or excluded from the political process are each uncertain when there are calls by interest groups for radical political change. Any of these changes would increase the level of policy uncertainty and simultaneous changes in all would have an even greater effect.
The Relative Efficacy of Two Strategies for Reacting to Policy Uncertainty
Given that increases in policy uncertainty generate corresponding increases in the variance of a subsidiary's expected profitability, effective strategies for reacting to policy uncertainty can generate substantial value for a firm. Firms seek to identify a country's level of policy uncertainty prior to investing and will only enter a country where the expected returns justify the additional variance in those returns. One would not therefore expect an independent effect of policy uncertainty on subsidiary performance. The exit rates of subsidiaries in a country with high policy uncertainty, however, may vary according to the efficacy of the strategies that these subsidiaries take to moderate the effect of policy uncertainty on their operations particularly where those strategies involve tradeoffs that can not readily be assessed at the time of entry.
A basic strategy for a firm to pursue to moderate future policy uncertainty is to devote resources to the identification of political risks and opportunities and to the influence of the policymaking process. If a firm pursues this strategy, it needs to identify the pivotal political actors that influence the policies of interest to them (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2002 , Krehbiel, 1999 and to develop influence strategies to guard against inimical policy change by those actors that serve the interests of the broader polity, their buyers or suppliers, their competitors or political actors at the firms' expense (Henisz & Zelner, 2004) . These influence strategies include the development of or participation in a lobbying coalition to deliver a message to these pivotal actors and the tailoring of that message to maximize the likelihood that those who receive the message will act upon it.
The magnitude of a firm's resource commitments to these influence strategies depends upon their relative efficacy in reducing policy uncertainty. As the checks and balances within a country's political institutions diminish (i.e., the political hazards increase), policymakers' discretion increases and influence strategies can offer more substantive reductions in policy uncertainty.
The nature of the lobbying coalition and the message that they deliver to that pivotal actor is also a function of the pivotal actor's preferences and position in the institutional structure. Changes in the political regime (Feng, 2001 , Kobrin, 1979 which alter the interest groups represented in government and the nature of interactions among political institutions may therefore reduce the value of past investments in cultivating contacts, developing lobbying coalitions and delivering messages, for reducing uncertainties about future policies in a given nation. Given the potential depreciation of past investments and the large fixed costs to begin anew under a new political regime, the efficacy of influence strategies is likely a decreasing function of regime instability.
A second strategy available to managers facing policy uncertainty, is to examine the strategic decisions of their peers and infer unobservable calculations on the expected level of profitability based on the observable entry and exit decisions of peers (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000 , Miner & Haunschild, 1995 . Based on their assessment of the accuracy of the information signal in these observations, managers could then update their prior beliefs regarding profitability levels.
Managers could also conclude that despite any internal reservations they had about the strategies adopted by their peers, it could possibly pay to imitate their peers decisions rather than deviate from these decisions (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993) . Finally, managers could eschew individual analysis of the policy environment or augment these analyses by imitating the strategic decisions of peers whose actions are perceived as legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 , Haunschild & Miner, 1997 , by following rules-of-thumb (March, 1988) or by simply following habits (Geertz, 1978) .
Although directly observing a firm's investments in political risk identification and management is difficult, it is possible to link observed variation in organizational performance under varying degrees of policy uncertainty to organizational characteristics that are associated with the adoption of these two strategies for managing uncertainty in the political environment. In our hypotheses, we will argue that firms with greater levels of organizational experience under the current political regime have an advantage over competitors in mounting an influence strategy. This advantage should be manifest in better performance, which we measure by subsidiary exit rates, in political environments where such strategies are likely to be more efficacious, that is, where policy uncertainty that derives from political hazards is high. In contrast, these same firms should have higher subsidiary exit rates in political environments where such strategies are likely to be less efficacious. We also directly examine the strategy of imitating peer exit under policy uncertainty of various types.
HYPOTHESES Organizational Experience and Influence Strategies
A manager's own experiences condition responses to policy uncertainty emanating from political hazards. This influence emerges from the process by which heterogeneous experience profiles help generate differential capabilities across organizations to identify and mitigate uncertainty that emanates from the political environment. These capabilities stem from routine-based systems that accumulate over the course of experiential learning (Cyert & March, 1963 , Levinthal & March, 1981 ).
An organization's routines are its encoded actions that encapsulate the knowledge and capabilities developed in its experiential learning (Nelson & Winter, 1982) . Routines develop through an incremental process, in which an organization's existing routines are updated based upon how managers interpret signals generated by their current decisions and associated outcomes. Chang (1995) and Pennings, Barkema and Douma (1994) provide empirical evidence consistent with such learning processes in their respective studies of expansion into new geographic and product markets. Similarly, Delios and Henisz (2000) and Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) find evidence that firms with extensive experience are better able to manage relationships with joint venture partners than inexperienced firms, even in the presence of policy or cultural uncertainty.
Experiential learning that can lead to the development of appropriate routines can enhance the efficacy of organizational strategies in the face of uncertainty emanating from a lack of information about an environment. In the case of policy uncertainty that comes from political hazards, prior experience in a given policymaking structure provides information that helps managers to improve their forecasts of future policies. Managers with relevant experience in a given policy setting can develop a good understanding of the nature of coalitions that could be formed, the preferences of policymakers, the compromises that a given political party or interest group are willing to make, the length of time it will take for a policy innovation to be enacted or other context-specific information that facilitates the delimitation of a choice set for their analysis (Geertz, 1978) . Managers can use this information to identify those actors for whom a shift in preferences will generate the largest change in the final policy outcomes and focus their lobbying or informational strategies upon those pivotal actors (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2002) .
These actors may include politicians, interest groups or alliance partners with strong political connections (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000) . Not only will prior experience facilitate the identification of these pivotal actors but it also facilitates the identification and implementation of an effective lobbying strategy (Henisz & Zelner, 2004) .
A lobbying strategy is undertaken in a context in which cognitively limited and time-constrained political actors are typically overburdened with multiple appeals for assistance from conflicting interest groups. These actors must balance whatever desires they have to serve the public welfare of their constituents or their nation, with the burdens of maintaining office through soliciting campaign contributions, votes or interest group support (Kingdon, 1984) . As a result, political actors respond more strongly to appeals that are closely linked to large blocks of political or financial support (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) . Such appeals are rarely esoteric or extremely technical in nature but rather appeal to broad-based beliefs or fit within existing "master frames" (Benford & Snow, 2000) that conform to preexisting heuristics, beliefs and biases (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) . Frames allow for the simplification of complex debate into a limited set of readily identifiable dimensions that reduce the burden for participation and decision (Benford & Snow, 2000) . For example, lobbying on the rate of telecommunications interconnection based on technical arguments surrounding actual costs or opportunity costs is less likely to be effective than appeals for free and fair competition. The latter "frame" appeals to an existing heuristic instantly recognizable by actors who have no inherent preference on interconnection pricing and no desire to enmesh themselves in the intricacies of the debate.
Experiential learning within a given structure of political institutions can thus aid an organization grappling with policy uncertainty emanating from that structure by reducing its lack of information that is the foundation for this form of uncertainty, and by extending its competence base as captured in routines that identify likely future policies, the pivotal actors that determine those policies and the lobbying or informational strategies that can most cost-effectively alter the opinion of these actors and, thereby, policy outcomes. The accumulation of relevant experience provides an organization with the opportunity to exploit its existing knowledge and routines in the current political environment, while also providing an opportunity to expand upon that knowledge and further refine its routines.
Hypothesis 1 (H1):
As policy uncertainty emanating from political hazards increases, an organization's experience under the current political regime has an increasingly negative effect on its subsidiaries' exit rates.
Although refining and exploiting organizational routines in a specific political context, reinforces an organization's competences to manage policy uncertainty, it is important to note that such refinement and exploitation carries the potential of maladaptation should the political context be dynamic or in flux (Amburgey & Miner, 1992) . In this regard, policy uncertainty that emerges from environmental dynamism, which in the political context takes the form of regime instability, concerns managers as these changes can alter success criteria for managing the political environment.
As the success criteria can change, the organizational experience under the current political regime that may alleviate the influence of policy uncertainty provides little benefit to the management of policy uncertainty that emanated from a change in the political regime.
Resources such as cultivated contacts and learned routines regarding lobbying processes developed for one political regime are imperfectly redeployable to its successor. Learned routines for mitigating policy uncertainty can even potentially become a liability in the aftermath of a regime transition. A firm that made an international expansion under one political regime, and accumulated experience relevant to the policy making of that particular regime, could find itself maladapted or even at a disadvantage under its successor. This maladaptation can enhance rates of exit in the presence of instability of the current regime or after a transition to a new regime (Baum & Ingram, 1998 , Ingram & Baum, 1997 . A straightforward example of this is the strategy of partnering with a Suharto family member in Indonesia. Such partnerships greatly enhanced performance up to 1997, but these same partnerships then greatly enhanced exit rates after the change in the regime led to Suharto's successors launching a campaign against corruption, cronyism and nepotism.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): As policy uncertainty emanating from regime instability increases, an organization's experience under the current political regime has an increasingly positive effect on its subsidiaries' exit rates.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b):
The greater an organization's experience under previous political regimes, the higher its subsidiaries' exit rates.
Imitation of Peer Exits
The second strategy for managing policy uncertainty follows from the idea that a firm's managers can imitate the decisions of peer firms to contend with uncertainty from the political environment. This idea has strong roots in neoinstitutional theory, which has a perspective on organizational action that views inter-organizational linkages (Haunschild, 1994) and reference groups (Greve, 2000 , Haunschild & Miner, 1997 as influencing organizational exit rates by providing an organization with support or legitimacy (Ingram & Baum, 1997) .
Under conditions of uncertainty, organizations turn to the behavior of peers, which drives the process of mimetic isomorphism, or the process by which organizations become more similar over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . Imitation can emerge as an organizational strategy because repeated actions by other organizations convey legitimacy and pressures on organizational actors to adopt similar decisions, thus inducing a spread of a decision, structure or strategy across a set of organizations (Fligstein, 1985 ).
An emerging view within the neoinstitutional literature represents a transition from the viewpoint that imitation is a pure social response (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) , to the idea that imitation may involve a technical rationale (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993) . Research points to the idea that the strength of the technical rationale is related to the salience of an imitable organizational structure or strategy. Where an organizational action has an observable outcome (Haunschild & Miner, 1997) , or where an organization's environment is somewhat predictable (Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990) , salience is greater, as is the strength of the technical rationale. This latter point relates to the idea that imitative behavior can be a result of vicarious learning about organizational actions in unequivocal settings in which the results of a strategy are observable (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000 , Levitt & March, 1988 . Prior work in the Japanese banking industry highlights the role of such learning processes in market niche entry decisions (Greve, 2000) .
Research on rational bandwagons conveys a similar prediction. Organizations can exhibit similarity and clustering in decisions and outcomes, such as organizational adoption, based on a concern that deviating from the practices of early adopters will carry negative performance consequences (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993) . Not all bandwagon effects are strictly technical, however. Bandwagon imitation can occur even in the presence of negative information on the performance of early adopters, or where there is uncertainty about the long-term performance implications of a strategy (Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999) .
Another technical rationale for the adoption of strategies previously used by one's peers relies on the assumption of incomplete information, which can lead managers to infer profitable strategies for their own organization based on the behavior of other organizations that share similar traits (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1998) . Note that in parallel to the arguments of social legitimacy, arguments that hinge on vicarious learning or rational bandwagon explanations also conclude with the point that uncertainty enhances the tendency to imitate other organizations. In the case of vicarious learning and rational bandwagons, however, imitation occurs because of its impact on incomplete information. Given that these arguments are parallel, we expect that imitation will be an effective response to uncertainty, whether that uncertainty emerges from a lack of information about an environment, as in the case of policy uncertainty, or from a dynamic change in the environment, as in the case of regime instability.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): As policy uncertainty emanating from political hazards increases, prior peer exits have an increasingly positive effect on subsidiary exit rates.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): As policy uncertainty emanating from regime instability increases, prior peer exits have an increasingly positive effect on subsidiary exit rates.
METHODS

Data Sources and Sample
We test these hypotheses using longitudinal data on the foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms.
Japan has been a leading source of FDI, which has flowed to an extensive number of countries.
According to the data we compiled, by 2000, more than 120 countries had received Japanese FDI, with 54 countries possessing at least 30 Japanese subsidiaries. This large country spread provides the variance we require on our measures of policy uncertainty and regime instability, to test this study's hypotheses, while controlling for other nation-level influences on exit rates. 
Independent Variables
Political Hazards. The political hazards index (political hazards) measures the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy (Henisz, 2000a) . The first step in the construction of this index is the identification of the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary and states or provinces) with veto power over policy change. The preferences of each of these branches and the status-quo policy were then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of policy uncertainty using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
The initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches.
Alignment across branches increased the feasibility of policy change. The measure is then further refined to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch.
Greater within-branch heterogeneity increases the costs of overturning policy for aligned branches.
The main results of the derivation are that (1) each additional veto point (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and controlled by a party different from other branches) provides a negative but diminishing effect on the total level of hazards and (2) homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of party preferences within an opposed (or aligned) branch of government is negatively correlated with the level of hazards. Scores for political hazards for a given country in a given year ranged from 0.1 (minimal hazards) to 1.0 (extremely hazardous).
1 The ten countries with the highest policy uncertainty that received Japanese foreign direct investment were Prior Exits. To measure the prevalence of mimetic isomorphism in exit behavior (Greve, 1995) we constructed, percentage of peer subsidiaries that exited in the prior year, which was the percentage of Japanese subsidiaries in the same 3-digit SIC industry and country as a focal subsidiary that exited in a given year. This measure was time-varying and lagged by one year.
There were 41 instances in 28 countries in which all of a firm's peers in the same 3-digit industry exited in a given year.
Industry, Firm and Subsidiary Controls. To capture national population-level effects of legitimation and competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) , we measured the density of Japanese firms' activities in the host country of a focal subsidiary. Given the absence of comparable data on the multinational spread of firms from other nations, we follow previous work in the international arena and operationalize this construct using the population of Japanese subsidiaries alone (Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1994) . Density was the number of Japanese subsidiaries operating in a given year in a focal subsidiary's industry and country. We introduced both raw counts and a quadratic term.
To account for the levels of flexibility a firm has to shift production from one location to the next in response to shocks (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990 , Kogut, 1983 we included Other subsidiaries, world. We defined this measure as the number of foreign subsidiaries owned by a firm in a given year. Other subsidiaries, host country was the number of foreign subsidiaries owned by a firm in a host country in a year. To examine the role of own firm exits in other countries to control for firm-specific factors that could lead to a global retrenchment independent of environmental uncertainty and to control for unobserved firm-level factors that could lead to a pattern of global exits by a firm, we included a count of Exits, rest of world, which was the number of subsidiaries of a firm that exited in a given year.
To account for the effect of organizational ties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) , we developed two measures of a firm's business group affiliations: horizontal business group and vertical business group. These indicator variables respectively marked whether a firm had an affiliation with any of the horizontal groups, or any of the vertical groups, in Japan. The source for these measures was Dodwell's publication, Industrial Groupings in Japan: The Anatomy of Keiretsu.
Finally, we included firm age and subsidiary age and their square terms in all models to examine for liabilities of newness (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983) , adolescence (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990 ) and age (Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994) . We measured firm size with the logarithm of firm employment (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983) . We sourced these timevarying measures from the Nikkei NEEDS tapes and Japanese Overseas Investment. Country controls. Country-level determinants of subsidiary exit rates could include market demand and market potential (Carroll & Hannan, 1989 
Modeling Procedure
We estimated exit rates using event history analysis, as implemented by an exponential model.
Event history analysis uses a longitudinal record of events in a sample from a population to examine the influences that a set of covariates have on an event. Our focal event is an exit by a subsidiary. In the analysis, each subsidiary x is at risk of exit from country i in each time period t, or until its exit occurs. This technique models the rate of a transition from an origin state to a destination state (exit) as a function of the covariates. Its general form is:
where r jk is the transition rate from origin state j to destination state k, with the observed covariate vector A jk , parameters to be estimated α jk and constant α jk0 . The duration of an event is described by an exponential distribution. The relationship between the covariates and the transition rate is specified as log-linear to ensure transition rate estimates are not negative. The estimation uses the maximum likelihood method (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995) . In the log-relative hazard parameterization we employ, hazard ratios greater (less) than one indicate exit rates increase (decrease) when the associated covariate increases in value. To estimate this model, we expanded the base sample into multiple spells that included all subsidiary-country-year combinations among the subsidiaries, countries and annual time periods in which an exit could occur. In each spell, a subsidiary was at risk of exiting and was treated as right censored unless an exit occurred. Once we divided the data into annual spells, we had as many as 12,206 observations but this dropped to 9,831 after casewise deletion of observations with missing independent variables. Table 2 presents the results of our analysis, incrementally adding the theoretical variables of interest. Models 1 and 2 present hazard ratios for the national, industry, firm and subsidiary-level control variables. Statistically significant hazard ratios of less than one indicate a reduction in exit rates whereas ratios greater than one indicate an increase in exit rates. Firm age initially reduces but subsequently increases exit rates. Subsidiary age has the opposite effect: first increasing but subsequently reducing exit rates. Membership in a horizontal business group reduces subsidiary exit rates. Firms with a larger global scope of operations experienced lower subsidiary exit rates and firms with a larger local scope of operations had higher subsidiary exit rates, consistent with the notions that other international operations increase a firm's leverage in negotiating with the government, while larger local operations enhance a firm's flexibility to relocate production across local plants.
RESULTS
We observed a strong positive relationship between a firm's exits in the rest of the world and the focal country suggesting that corporate strategies of downsizing have a significant effect across multiple host country markets independent of any country-specific considerations. Size had no independent effect on subsidiary exit rates nor did country-industry density or our country-level macroeconomic variables. The year, region and industry indicator variables improved the model's explanatory power. Subsidiary exit rates were higher in Europe and South America and in 1996-99, than in the excluded region-years of Asia in 1992-93.
--Insert Table 2 About Here --Model 3 adds the main effects for the two determinants of policy uncertainty: political hazards and regime instability. As we expected, we observed no direct relationship between either of our determinants of policy uncertainty and subsidiary exit rates. Model 4 adds the main effects for the percentage of peer subsidiaries that exited in the prior year and organizational experience both under the current political regime and those that preceded it. Here, we observe a significant and substantial effect of prior peer exits and a liability of experience that is larger for experience under preceding regimes than that for experience under the current regime. We tested for the presence of a quadratic relationship, but the effect of host country experience was adequately captured by the logarithmic measure introduced here. Models 5 and 6 individually add the sets of interaction effects that are the focus of our empirical tests and Model 7 includes both sets.
In models 3-7, the hazard ratios from Model 2 are qualitatively unchanged although the hazard ratios for subsidiary age and horizontal business groups are no longer statistically significant in the latter models. Country-industry density becomes weakly significant indicating some evidence for legitimation and competition effects.
In models 5-7, the hazard ratios on our interaction terms provide good empirical support for four of our five hypotheses. In contrast to the lack of a direct relationship between any of the determinants of policy uncertainty or the measure of experience under the current political regime and subsidiary exit rates, the interactions in Model 7, which are consistent with those in models 5 and 6, demonstrate that exit rates for firms with this type of experience that should facilitate the implementation of influence strategies so long as the environment remains stable, have lower exit rates as political hazards increases (H1). We also find that experience under the current regime increases exit rates as regime instability increases (H2a) and that experience under past regimes increases subsidiary exit rates (H2b). Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the predicted effect of percentage of peer subsidiaries that exited in the prior year on subsidiary exit is greater, the higher the political hazards. Subsidiaries are more likely to exit a country when peers exit, particularly in the presence of uncertainty over future policies generated by the structure of a nation's political institutions. We do not find support for H3b which predicted a similar relationship between prior exits and regime instability.
An examination of hazard rate multipliers for various combinations of the independent variables of theoretical interest, as depicted in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4, demonstrates the economic significance of the results reported in Table 2 . In Figure 1 , we plot the predicted hazard ratios associated with setting policy uncertainty at the value given on the x-axis and experience under the current political leadership and prior governments at one standard deviation above (high) or below (low) the mean, as indicated in the legend. We see sharp differences between subsidiaries with high and low levels of experience under the current political regime. As predicted by H1, the subsidiaries with high experience display a negative relationship between subsidiary exit rates, as plotted on the y-axis, and the level of political hazards. Subsidiaries with low experience, in contrast, display a positive relationship. For example, if we compare firms with no experience under prior regimes, the effect of increasing political hazards by one standard deviation (0.4) from its mean value (0.6) is to increase exit rates for a firm with low levels of experience under the current political regime by 9 percent. The same increase in political hazards leads to a reduction in exit rates of 63 percent, for a firm with high levels of experience under the current political regime. For firms with high levels of experience under prior regimes, the effect is more muted varying from a 4 percent increase in exit rates to a 16 percent decrease.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the liability of experience in the political environment by plotting the hazard rate multipliers relative to the values plotted in Figure 1 when the same subsidiary faces a potential or actual change in political regime (H2a) or possesses experience from prior regimes (H2b). Consistent with H2a, Figure 2 shows that regime instability increases exit rates particularly for those firms with high levels of experience under the current regime. For these firms, the hazard rate of exit increases by between 225 (when political hazards are at their minimum and the possibility of retribution is therefore reduced) and 710 percent (when political hazards are at their maximum and the possibility of retribution is therefore enhanced). By contrast, for firms with low experience under the current regime, the effects are minimal ranging from 4 to 5 percent. Consistent with H2b, Figure 3 shows that firms with experience under previous regimes one standard deviation above the mean have exit rates 217 to 883 percent higher, with the greatest effect felt by those firms that possess minimal experience under the current political regime.
In Figure 4 , we examine the marginal effect on the predicted hazard ratio of the percentage of peer subsidiaries that exited in the prior year at low (one standard deviation below the mean) and high (one standard deviation above the mean) values of policy uncertainty. We find that when just one percent of peer subsidiaries exited in the prior year, the predicted exit rate was 43 to 54 percent lower than at the mean value of prior peer exits. Meanwhile, when 20 percent of peer subsidiaries exit, the effect is to increase exit rates by 872 to 1085 percent. Consistent with H3a, the relationship between the prior exit of peer subsidiaries and the exit rate of a firm's subsidiaries is particularly strong where policy uncertainty is high. As compared to environments with low policy uncertainty, those with high levels of policy uncertainty show a 24 percent increase in the effect of prior peer exits.
--Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 About Here --
Sensitivity Analyses
We examined the sensitivity of our results to several alternative theoretical explanations and distributional assumptions regarding hazard rates across time. First, we examined several definitions of the inter-organizational environment so as to insure that our definition of a peer group at the level of the industry was not driving our results. We divided all Japanese firms into high and low status cohorts where status was defined by size (sales, assets or employees) and age. We found consistent evidence of imitation in both the high and low status subsamples though the effects were much stronger among high status firms as suggested by the work of Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) . The effects of organizational experience (both positive and negative), were strongest for smaller, although not necessarily younger, firms.
Next, we examined if the experience measures proxied for the resource buffering effect of firm size or diversification that would minimize the impact of uncertainty (Thompson, 1967) .
Interactions of policy uncertainty and regime instability with indicator variables for horizontal or vertical group membership and employment and sales proxies for firm size failed to generate statistically significant coefficient estimates or to change the results in our base specification.
Given the literature on culture and subsidiary performance (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996) , we added measures of cultural uncertainty and interacted these with measures of referent and own-firm experience in the same cultural block. These additions did not alter our results.
Prior studies have found links between corporate performance and exit rates using such proxies as a firm's return-on-sales or return-on-assets, but the inclusion of these variables did not improve the fit of our model. Similarly, multiple proxies for a country's cost of capital (Anderson & Tushman, 2001 ) did not improve model fit. We examined the role of tax policies at the aggregate level and found a positive association between the rate of capital taxation and subsidiary exit in the reduced sample of country-years for which tax data were available. Once again, the results of theoretical interest were unchanged. We introduced additional macroeconomic data into the specification. When we included the change in the real effective exchange rate, the growth in real per capita income, the growth of population, the percentage of value-added from manufacturing, the government budget balance, and the government debt to GDP ratio, the results did not change substantively.
We examined the sensitivity of our results in our base specification to various hazard functions including the Cox proportional hazards model, a Weibull distribution and a Gamma distribution.
The results were qualitatively unchanged across these functional forms.
DISCUSSION
We investigated the phenomenon of subsidiary exit in international expansions. As these expansions were made across clearly-defined national borders, we were able to test for the influence of a particular type of environmental uncertainty emanating from differences in national political structures, namely policy uncertainty, on subsidiary exit rates. Although we observed no direct influence of two determinants of policy uncertainty -political hazards and regime instability -on exit rates, we did find that these determinants of policy uncertainty differentially affected exit rates depending on a firm's level and type of experience in a host country and the actions of its peer firms.
Despite the prominence attached to the concept of environmental influences in neoinstitutional research, the question of the relative efficacy of various firm strategies for managing various types of environmental uncertainty remains relatively under-explored. Further, despite the prominent role ascribed to political change and political processes in organizational survival (Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001 , Ranger-Moore, 1997 , neoinstitutional research has only recently started to exploit the natural variation in the political environment in an international setting (Guillén, 2002 , Henisz & Delios, 2001 , Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998 . Our results address both of these limitations in previous research.
Notably, we find that two determinants of policy uncertainty, political hazards and regime instability, did not directly lead to higher rates of subsidiary exit. This observation stands somewhat in contrast to the general finding that environmental uncertainty creates differential stresses on organizations such that when uncertainty is heightened, an organization's ability to adapt to its changed environment, will vary in such characteristics as age (Ranger-Moore, 1997), size (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993) , and inter-organizational linkages (Kraatz, 1998) .
Given that the context of our study is organizational expansion into a new market, our observation of no baseline influence of policy uncertainty on exit rates implies that organizations self-select into environments with varying levels of uncertainty. Environments that have higher levels of uncertainty ex ante are populated by organizations that have the capabilities to manage this form of uncertainty or potential returns that warrant an attempt to do so. In this sense, at least in the context of international expansion, uncertainty itself does not elevate exit rates.
Within a particular policy environment, however, we observed that subsidiaries do exhibit differential rates of exit depending on the level and type of experience a firm possesses, as well as the actions of peer firms. This variation is linked to the nature of policy uncertainty realized in a given country ex post. Specifically, if the structure of a host country's political institutions lends a wide range of discretion to policymakers, a firm's experience within that institutional structure may help provide it with useful information and resources that can aid in influencing policy outcomes. This experience can thereby reduce realized policy uncertainty. By contrast, where political institutions themselves are subject to discontinuous change, firms face even greater difficulties in influencing policy outcomes. Furthermore, the same information and resources that may have been important assets in the past can be transformed into substantial liabilities. This finding reinforces the notion that experience provides an organization with an advantage over its competitors as long as conditions in the environment remain comparatively stable. In the aftermath of environmental change, inexperienced organizations can be at an advantage relative to their experienced counterparts. After an environmental change, an inexperienced organization faces a single hurdle in learning about the new environment, while an experienced counterpart faces a double-hurdle of learning about the new environment, while trying to slough resources and routines related to the old environment.
Our examination of exit decisions also provides a useful extension to research on interorganizational influences to environmental uncertainty. Extant research has focused on the entry decision (Guillén, 2002 , Haunschild & Miner, 1997 , Henisz & Delios, 2001 ) in corporate diversification. Our research shows how the inter-organizational environment, as manifest in the pattern of peer firms' decisions, continues to influence a firm's strategy even after it has entered a market, which in turn leads to the idea that among organizations already present in a market mimesis continues to drive convergence in organizational strategies and structures (Fligstein, 1985) .
This convergence came from our observation that managers fashioned their responses to policy uncertainty with reference to the actions of peer firms. The overall tendency was for a greater rate of exit given higher levels of peer exit, but this effect was exacerbated by the level of political hazards. In nations characterized as politically hazardous, where future policies are uncertain, firms tend to move in concert to exit a nation. This finding reinforces the idea that following the herd becomes a more common organizational strategy under conditions of uncertainty, where that uncertainty stems from a lack of information about the environment.
The strategic implications of these results are that firms that readily crawl into bed with a given political regime may enjoy a short-term advantage but that gain needs to be balanced against the long-term costs of maladaptation to, or retribution by, succeeding regimes. Simply following the herd is another strategy that may be used in place of or alongside the development of specific information on, and ties to, an existing regime. The choice of political risk management strategies depends on managers' prior beliefs regarding the stability of the current regime. Where political hazards are high but the regime appears inherently stable, building strong ties to the existing regime enhances performance. Where political hazards coincide with regime instability, however, a more fluid strategy of following the herd will avoid the costs of associating with a dying regime. While this conclusion may appear somewhat intuitive, our results are the first to show how subsidiary exit rates vary in a broad sample of countries that differ in the determinants of policy uncertainty. At the same time, we demonstrate the types of firms and strategies under which subsidiaries enjoyed lower exit rates, given specific types of policy uncertainty.
Our results identify that the strategies used for contending with policy uncertainty depended on the nature of the uncertainty. Information based uncertainty could be addressed at one level by following the actions of peer organizations, and at another level by developing experience to overcome the information deficiency which is at the source of the uncertainty. For uncertainty that comes from dynamic change in an environment, imitative and experience-based strategies provided less benefit to an organization than for the case of information-based uncertainty.
Perhaps, more importantly, experience-based strategies can become a liability in a dynamic environment, which is a finding that connects to research on the applicability and erosion of experience over time.
Limitations and Future Research
Similar to research that has identified how the home business context can exert substantial influences on a firm's international expansion decisions (Guillén, 2002) , we considered only the case of home country competitors. In the international environment, other firms from the home country are among the most likely to be observed (Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998) , and
imitated. An industry is an appropriate defining context (Baum & Mezias, 1992 , Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991 as the actions of organizations of the same type as a focal organization are more likely to be observed closely (Haveman, 1993) . In focusing on the behavior of peer firms and on organizational experience, we did not consider firm-specific resources, entry mode choice (Lu, 2002) , subsidiary characteristics, or the identity of joint venture partners as influences on exit rates given environmental uncertainty. An analysis of these endogenous choices would necessitate a two-stage selection model that separates the effects of a firm's characteristics and its external environment on the strategy choice, from their impact on exit rates (Shaver, 1998) .
The absence of a mimetic response in the case of regime instability could indicate that, contrary to our theoretical arguments, firms are relatively capable of independently discerning the nature of such a fundamental political transformation and thus do not need to rely upon peer behavior.
Policy uncertainty emanating from political hazards is a complex and ambiguous form of environmental uncertainty in which many political actors interact to shape a range of future policies of interest to the firm. When we hold the level of political hazards constant, as we do in our empirical specification, the potential replacement of the political regime of a host country with another is a more observable, straightforward and easy to interpret type of change than policy uncertainty emanating from political hazards. The question of whether a new potential regime is better or worse than its predecessor may not be one for which managers rely heavily upon the behavior of peer firms to answer. Another explanation for the lack of support of our hypothesis revolves around a potential benefit of regime change. If firms well-connected to the prior regime leave, it enhances the ability of previously poorly-connected firms to become relatively well-connected to the new political regime. This positive substitution effect could offset the negative information effect leading to the lack of a statistically significant relationship.
Conclusion
We use variation in the determinants of policy uncertainty across national environments to demonstrate that organizations rely upon cues from their peers and upon organizational experience to manage policy uncertainty. We demonstrate that imitation is a strong influence in the decision to exit a country particularly when political hazards are high. We call attention to organizational experience by demonstrating that firms with relevant experience profiles are better able to forecast or influence future policy environments and thus enjoy lower exit rates.
These same firms are, however, at a disadvantage in the event of a change in the current political regime. We argue that these findings point to two strategies for dealing with policy uncertainty:
imitation (following the herd) or the development of specific resources and ties to the current political regime (sleeping with the enemy). Our study thus highlights the importance for researchers to carefully define the types of environmental uncertainty that an organization faces and the factors that influence the relationships between these types of uncertainty and organizational performance. 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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